Your brain is your own. Intelligent, open collaboration can expand your mind-with words and with drugs. Only ignorance and misinformation can allow someone else to control it-with their own words or with their own drugs or with their imaginary fears.
INTRODUCTION
In Riggins v. Nevada,' the United States Supreme Court held that a person detained for trial has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in being free from the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. 2 The Court held that Riggins was denied due process of law when Nevada compelled him to take medication prior to trial without first balancing Riggins' liberty interest against the State's interests in medicating its detainee. 3 The Court concluded that a strong possibility existed that this error prejudiced Riggins' trial since the effects of antipsychotic drugs may have impacted Riggins' outward appearance, his testimony, and his ability to follow the proceedings and communicate with his attorney. 4 This Note examines the development of the liberty interest in freedom from forced medication and the Court's extension of that interest in Riggins v. Nevada. This Note argues that although the Court ruled correctly, it provided little guidance as to how competing personal and state interests should be balanced in future cases. This Note concludes that the Court's opinion should be interpreted making it possible for the mentally ill to function in the community. 9 The maximal effects of antipsychotic drugs will generally be evident after four to six weeks of treatment following an acute exacerbation of a schizophrenic illness.' 0 For patients with chronic psychosis, maintenance doses of antipsychotic medication may be administered indefinitely to prevent future exacerbations.I Since no single substitute can provide the advantages of antipsychotic drugs, " [d] enying... patients the benefit of the neuroleptic action without offering any suitable alternative may be considered a clinical error."' 12 However, the clear benefits of antipsycotic drugs must be considered in light of their potentially serious side effects. 13 Although all available antipsychotic drugs are equally effective in treating schizophrenia and have the same set of possible side effects, the potency of individual compounds varies widely. 14 For example, Mellaril, the drug at issue in Riggins v. Nevada, and Thorazine are the least potent antipsychotics.' 5 Recommended adult doses for these drugs is 200-400 milligrams per day,' 6 although physicians generally prescribe a lower dose initially and increase it as needed. 17 The maximum daily dose is 800 milligrams.' 8 Highly potent antipsychotics such as Prolixin and Haldol require much smaller doses to attain the same effects. 19 Even when properly prescribed, all antip-sychotic drugs can cause both neurological and non-neurological side effects. 2 0 However, "one generalization about the adverse effects from antipsychotics is that low-potency drugs [like Mellaril] cause more non-neurological adverse effects and that high-potency drugs cause more neurological adverse effects." 2 1
One of the common non-neurological side effects of antipsychotic drugs is sedation or somnolence. 2 2 Sedation can be avoided by giving the entire daily dose at bedtime until the patient develops a tolerance to the sedative effect of the drug. 2 3 Orthostatic hypotension, which causes fainting and falling, also generally occurs at the onset of antipsychotic treatment before the patient develops a tolerance for the drugs. 24 Other possible non-neurological side effects include decreased libido in both sexes and impotence in males; peripheral anticholinergic effects such as dry mouth, constipation, urinary retention, nausea, and vomiting; central anticholinergic effects such as agitation, disorientation, hallucinations, seizures, and coma; retinal pigmentation which may result in blindness; agranulocytosis, a potentially fatal blood condition; lethal cardiotoxicity; allergic dermatitis; and weight gain. 25 Many of these effects can be controlled by reducing dosages, adding other medicine, or changing to a different antipsychotic drug. 2 6 These side effects generally cease when the drugs are discontinued, although chronically ill patients on maintenance doses of antipsychotic drugs may suffer permanent side effects. Neurological side effects include dystonias, parkinsonian symptoms, akathisia, tardive dyskinesia, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, and seizures. 28 Dystonic movements involve muscle spasms in the eyes, neck, face, tongue, and arms. 2 9 Parkinsonian symptoms incompared to 100 milligrams of Thorazine; for example, less than 5 milligrams of Prolixin is as efficacious as 100 milligrams ofThorazine. Id. There are numerous other antipsychotic compounds with potencies between these extremes. Id. 20 See Brief of American Psychiatric Association, supra note 5, at 8; KAPLAN & SADOCK,
clude muscle stiffness, stooped posture, a mask-like face, tremors, and drooling.3 0 Akathisia is muscular discomfort that causes restlessness and agitation.
3 l Both dystonic and parkinsonian effects occur relatively often, although less so when Mellaril is used. 3 2 Other drugs may be used to treat the symptoms of these side effects until a patient develops a tolerance to the antipsychotic.
3 3 Even when the adverse effects persist, they are not particularly serious and can be eliminated by reducing the dosage or ceasing antipsychotic medication. The remaining neurological effects are of greater concern, however. Tardive dyskinesia causes abnormal and involuntary movements of the face, mouth, tongue, jaw, and extremities.
3 5 "Both the risk of developing [tardive dyskinesia] and the likelihood that it will become irreversible are believed to increase as the duration of treatment and the total cumulative dose of neuroleptic drugs administered to the patient increase." 3 6 There is no known treatment for tardive dyskinesia; prevention is best achieved by minimizing dosages.
3 7 Neuroleptic malignant syndrome is a potentially fatal side effect manifested by elevated fever and pulse, muscular rigidity, and altered mental states that requires the immediate discontinuation of antipsychotic drugs and intensive medical treatment.
3 8 Finally, the risk of seizure must be considered when medicating patients who are susceptible to seizures. The extraordinary mind-affecting benefits of antipsychotic drugs, as well as their potentially devastating side effects, are of greatest concern when the drugs are administered without a patient's consent. The forcible administration of these powerful drugs intrudes on a person's bodily autonomy and, hence, presents important legal issues. 
B. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 40 This Clause protects those liberties that are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. ' 41 The Fourteenth Amendment thus incorporates and applies to the states those provisions of the Bill of Rights which prevent federal encroachment on basic rights. 4 2 The due process guarantee, however, is not limited to freedoms enumerated in the Constitution; rather, it applies to all freedoms "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." ' 43 To apply the Due Process Clause, then, the Supreme Court must first decide whether an asserted interest falls within the scope of the Clause before determining whether that right was adequately protected. 4 4 To determine whether a substantive right was unjustly violated, due process requires the Court to balance "the liberty of the individual" against "the demands of an organized society." 4 5 Both the substantive freedoms recognized by the Due Process Clause and the specific Sixth Amendment rights incorporated by the Clause are of import here. The Court ruled against Harper, however, because his admittedly substantial interest in avoiding forced medication was outweighed by the state's interests in prescribing antipsychotic drugs. 51 Two state interests were served by medicating Harper: the police power interest in controlling violent behavior in prisons, and the parens patriae duty to provide for prisoners' health and safety. Since "[t]here are few cases in which the State's interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison environment," 5 3 the Court applied a standard of review that was deferential to the prison authorities "best equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison administration." 54 An intrusive prison regulation will be upheld if it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 55 The Harper Court deferred to the medical and penal experts, who decided to medicate Harper since antipsychotic medicine was both reasonably related to the security of the prison and the appropriate medical treatment for Harper's disorder. 56 Although the Harper holding was limited by its facts to convicted prisoners, it seems reasonable to expect that unconvicted persons detained by a state would enjoy at least as much liberty as compel medication, such medication would proceed subject to periodic review. Id. at . 50 Id. at 229-30. The Court particularly emphasized the risk of acute dystonia, akathisia, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, and tardive dyskinesia. Id. However, the majority noted the medical uncertainty about the frequency and severity of the side effects and emphasized the need to defer to medical judgments about the benefits of the drugs in individual cases. convicted criminals. The Court has so held. 57 A state's interest in secure facilities and healthy inmates is the same whether the inmate is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner. 58 However, since detainees await trial, they arguably have greater interests at stake than convicted prisoners, for they are adversely affected by any act which influences the fairness of their trial.
Accordingly, in cases prior to Harper involving the forcible medication of pretrial detainees, two lower courts applied a stricter standard of review than the one adopted by the Harper Court. In Bee v. Greaves, 5 9 the Tenth Circuit held that, absent an emergency, compelling a detainee to take antipsychotic drugs is not reasonably related to the goal of prison security. 6 0 Under Bee, a state's interest in medicating would outweigh an individual's right to refuse that medication only in a prison emergency and if the medicine was medically appropriate and the least intrusive means available.
6 '
Relying in part on Bee, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Charters, 6 2 initially refused to defer to medical professionals and held that a competent detainee's liberty interest outweighs any governmental interests in preventing violence, protecting health, and rendering the accused competent to stand trial. 63 For an incompetent detainee, the trial court would have to determine "what treatment the patient would, if competent, select for himself," rather than defer to attending medical experts.64 On rehearing, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed Charters and held that due process is fulfilled if the decision to medicate is based on the responsible judgment of appropriate professionals. 65 This reversal left the circuits at odds as to whether the decision to medicate pretrial detainees warrants stricter scrutiny than the decision to medicate convicted prisoners.
In Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to determine the appropriate standard of review in cases involving the forcible medication of pretrial detainees. The Court could have chosen to apply Harper's deferential reasonableness standard, or it could have agreed with the Tenth Circuit that increased scrutiny is warranted by the patient's status as a pretrial detainee. Since the effects of antipsychotic drugs administered before trial will often linger into trial, both the State and the detainee have interests which are not present when the rights of convicted prisoners are at issue. Thus, in addition to the issues presented in Harper, the Riggins Court had to consider the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.
Sixth Amendment Implications
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the accused in all criminal prosecutions the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 6 6 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees "the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial" to defendants in state courts. 6 7 This guarantee incorporates, but is not limited to, the rights enumerated in the Sixth Amendment. 68 It has long been accepted that the conviction of an incompetent defendant violates due process. 69 Competency hearings are now held prior to trial, at which courts make two inquiries about the defendant's cognitive abilities: whether a criminal defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." While a determination of competency under this test is not sufficient to prove that a defendant received a fair trial, such a determination is necessary because the elements of a fair trial presuppose, and depend upon, mental competence. 7 1 The rights enumerated in the Sixth Amendment thus presume the competence of a defendant but may, of course, be violated even if the defendant is competent.
The Sixth Amendment specifically provides that defendants have the right to the assistance of counsel for their defense. 72 The defendant has a right to give advice to his lawyer and make suggestions regarding his defense, as well as "to supercede his lawyer altogether and conduct the trial himself." 73 Of course, in order to decide whether to exercise these rights, the defendant must be able to understand the proceedings against him, 7 4 must not be excluded from the proceedings, 75 and must not be precluded from consulting with his attorney.
The Sixth Amendment also grants an accused the right to confront the witnesses who testify against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses to assist in his defense. 77 Derived from these rights is the due process requirement that the defendant be allowed to testify, since he is often "the most important witness for the defense." 7 8 The exercise of "duress on [a] witness' mind mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such capacity endures.").
71 Blackstone wrote long ago that a "mad" offender should not be arraigned "because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. 
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[so] as to preclude him from making a free and voluntary choice" regarding his testimony is an infringement on a defendant's right to a fair trial. 79 Moreover, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation can be violated even if the defendant's choice as to whether to testify is unimpaired. Since the defendant is always present at trial, her demeanor and appearance may affect ajuror's judgment regardless of whether or not the defendant testifies. 8 0 Jurors may be especially conscious of the defendant's demeanor at trial when her sanity is at issue."' Further, evidence of mental problems can be relevant as a mitigating factor in the sentencing stage of capital crimes. Due process does not guarantee the unfettered enjoyment of these Sixth Amendment rights, however. The Court has indeed "recognized that certain practices pose such a threat to the 'fairness of the factfinding process' that they must be subjected to 'dose judicial scrutiny.' "83 However, even this close scrutiny has not precluded the Court from finding essential state interests which justify trial prejudice. In Illinois v. Allen, 8 4 the Court held that the State's interest in maintaining courtroom decorum allowed an obstreperous defendant to be bound and gagged, despite the "significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant" which such treatment might have. 8 5 In Estelle v. Williams, 8 6 however, the Court held that a state cannot compel a defendant to be tried while wearing jail clothes. 8 7 The Court found no essential state interest to weigh against the effects the clothes may have on a jury's perception of the defendant. 88 The Court acknowledged in Estelle that "the actual impact of a particular practice on the judgment ofjurors cannot always be fully determined" but concluded that, in balancing interests, courts "must do the best they can to evaluate the likely effects of a particular procedure, based on reason, principle, and common Until Riggins, the Supreme Court had never considered the effects of antipsychotic drugs on a defendant's right to a fair trial. As a general matter, the Court had held that a state has an interest in bringing an accused to trial, but that interest is "necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases."
90 Lower courts were split on the issue of whether a state's interest in using antipsychotics to render an accused competent to stand trial justified compelled medication.
9 ' Most courts focused on the ability of the drugs to enhance cognitive thought processes and concluded that the drugs may be administered at trial as long as the drugged defendant retains the cognitive capacity to pass the competency test. 92 To offset any prejudice caused by the effects of the drugs on the defendants' outward appearance and demeanor, these courts relied on testimony by experts and the defendants themselves to inform jurors about the effects of the drugs. 93 Other courts stressed the undesirable effects of antipsychotic drugs and held that testimony cannot adequately substitute for a showing of the defendant in an unmedicated condition. The district court denied Riggins' motion without explaining its rationale or resolving the conflicting expert testimony. 119 Riggins continued to receive the maximum dosage of Mellaril each day through the end of his trial in November 1988. 120 At his trial Riggins presented an insanity defense.121 Testifying on his own behalf, Riggins admitted that he used cocaine prior to entering Wade's apartment and that he fought with Wade. 12 2 However, Riggins testified that Wade was trying to kill him and that voices in his head told him that killing Wade would be justifiable homicide. 123 A jury found Riggins guilty of murder and robbery, both with use of a deadly weapon, and sentenced Riggins to death. 124 On appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, Riggins claimed, among other things, that the forced administration of Mellaril violated his Sixth Amendment right to a full and fair trial by preventing him from assisting in his own defense and by prejudicially affecting his attitude, appearance, and demeanor at trial. 125 Riggins argued that this prejudice was unjustified since the state never demonstrated a need to have Riggins on Mellaril and never explored less intrusive alternatives to administering the maximum dose of 800 milligram per day.
126
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins' conviction and sentence. 12 7 The court concluded that Riggins' demeanor was relevant to his insanity defense, but found that there was sufficient expert testimony at trial to inform the jury of the effects Mellaril had on Riggins' demeanor. 1 28 Thus, the court held that the denial of Riggins' motion to terminate his medication was neither an abuse of the trial court's discretion nor a violation of Riggins' Sixth Amendment rights. 129 In a concurring opinion, Justice Rose stated that prior to forcing Riggins to take the drug, the lower court should have determined whether Riggins truly needed to be on Mellaril and whether he could function adequately without the drug. 3 0 Nevertheless, Justice Rose concluded, based on the entire record, that Riggins received a fair trial.1 3 ' Justice Springer argued vigorously in dissent that a defendant may never be forced to take antipsychotic drugs simply so the state can bring him to trial.' The key part of the majority's opinion is the Court's decision to extend the holding in Washington v. Harper to pretrial detainees. 3 9 Justice O'Connor quoted at length from the Harper opinion in cataloging the potential side effects of antipsychotic drugs and reiterated that the forced administration of the drugs is a "particularly severe" interference with a person's liberty.14 0 The Court then held that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much protection to persons the state detains for trial" as it does to convicted prisoners. 141 The majority never decided how much more protection, if any, detainees are entitled to than prisoners because Nevada failed to provide even the minimum protections prescribed by Harper. As Justice O'Connor stated, "Under Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriate- ness."' 14 2 Thus, even under the standard used for prisoners, "once Riggins moved to terminate... medication, the State became obligated to establish the need for Mellaril and the medical appropriateness of the drug." 143 The majority presumed that Mellaril was medically appropriate since Riggins never argued otherwise, although they noted that Riggins received a very high dose.1 44 Riggins' rights were unjustifiably violated, though, when the trial court "allowed administration of Mellaril to continue without making any determination of the need for this course."' 45 Since there was no finding that any State need outweighed Riggins' liberty, the majority did not have to decide what substantive standards should be used for judging cases involving forcibly medicated pretrial detainees or defendants.1 46 The majority did conclude that due process would have been satisfied if Nevada had shown that Mellaril was medically appropriate, essential for Riggins' safety or the safety of others, and the least intrusive means to achieve these state interests. 1 4 7 The majority also acknowledged that "other compelling concerns," besides safety, could be found to outweigh the interest of an accused.' 4 8 The majority rejected the dissent's assertion that, by mentioning a compelling state interest and the least intrusive means to achieve that interest, they had abandoned Harper's standard of asking only whether a restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. 4 9 Justice O'Connor explicitly denied adopting a standard of strict scrutiny and stated that there was simply "no occasion to finally prescribe such substantive standards."' 5 0 The majority held only that the trial court erred by failing to consider Riggins' liberty interest; hence, the Nevada Supreme Court should have overturned the verdict.' 5 '
The majority concluded that this was reversible error since there was a strong possibility that Mellaril influenced the outcome of Riggins Rather, once Riggins proved a "strong possibility" of prejudice, the State assumed the burden of proving either that this prejudice did not exist or that it was justified by "an essential state interest."' 5 5
The majority held that Nevada failed to prove either the lack of prejudice or an essential state interest. Justice O'Connor believed that even if the Nevada Supreme Court was correct in its belief that expert testimony allowed the jurors to assess fairly Riggins' demeanor at trial, an unacceptable risk of prejudice remained. 15 6 Expert testimony "did nothing to cure the possibility that the substance of his own testimony, his interaction with counsel, or his comprehension at trial were compromised by forced administration of Mellaril."' 15 7 Justice O'Connor did recognize a state interest in bringing an accused to trial. ' 5 8 However, the trial court never found that Mellaril was necessary to ensure Riggins' competence, and the testimony did not support such a conclusion.' 59 The majority refused to speculate whether a defendant's interests would still outweigh the state's if the medicine is needed to render the defendant competent for trial. ' 60 The majority concluded that since the record revealed nothing to prove that essential state interests required the forced administration of Mellaril, the potential for prejudice caused by the drug was unjustified. Justice Kennedy agreed that Riggins had a liberty interest in being free from antipsychotic drugs. 16 3 Justice Kennedy would have proceeded, however, to establish standards which afford greater protection to pretrial detainees than to convicted prisoners. Justice Kennedy saw a fundamental difference between Harper and Riggins. He distinguished between a prison situation, in which medicine is given to ensure that a prisoner functions in a non-violent way, and a trial situation, where "the avowed purpose of the medication is not functional competence, but competence to stand trial."' 164 In prison situations, an objective determination can be made as to whether an inmate's behavior complies with minimum standards. 165 When competency to stand trial is at issue, however, a subjective determination of a defendant's capacity must be made. 166 Given the interests at stake in a criminal proceeding, Justice Kennedy would "require the State in every case to make a showing that there is no significant risk that the mediction will impair or alter in any material way the defendant's capacity or willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel."' 16 7 Justice Kennedy expressed skepticism that a state could ever make a showing that would justify forced medication because of the inherent risks of antipsychotic drugs.' 68 He identified two principal ways in which the drugs prejudice the accused. Initially, the accused's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are implicated because the drugs affect the accused's demeanor both on the witness stand and in the courtroom.' 69 Justice Kennedy reviewed the potential side effects of antipsychotic drugs and concluded that the drugs "may alter demeanor in a way that will prejudice all facets of the defense."' 170 He noted that the prejudice can be especially acute during sentencing, when the jury ''must attempt to know the heart and mind of the offender and judge his character." 17 1 In a capital case, the jury's character assess-162 Id-at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 163 Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 164 It-at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 165 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) . 166 It (Kennedy, J., concurring). 167 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) . 168 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) . justice Kennedy noted that determining the effects ofantipsychotic drugs is itself an elusive inquiry since experts may not be able to discern a baseline normality for each defendant. Id.
169 I. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) . 171 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) . ment may determine whether the defendant lives or dies. 1 72 Justice Kennedy also argued that antispychotic drugs can prejudice the accused by interfering with the attorney-client relationship. The side effects of the drugs can prevent "effective communication" and make the defendant "less able or willing to take part in his defense." 173 Justice Kennedy believed antipsychotic drugs could be prescribed "for the very purpose of imposing constraints on the defendant's own will."
174 He observed that it is the accused, rather than her attorney, who has the right to conduct her own defense. 175 Any interference with the accused's ability or will to defend herself, or the manner in which she does so, is comparable to the manipulation of evidence by the State.' 76 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that "absent an extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits prosecuting officials from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic medicines."' 17 7
According to Justice Kennedy, if a state cannot make such a showing, it must resort to civil commitment unless the accused is competent to stand trial without the drugs. Justice Kennedy recognized that a state has an interest in rendering the accused competent to stand trial, 178 Justice Thomas also rejected Riggins' claim that his trial was prejudiced because Mellaril interfered with his ability to participate in his defense. Justice Thomas recognized that the conviction of a legally incompetent person violates due process.1 9 2 However, Justice Thomas stressed that the trial court had specifically found Riggins competent while he was taking Mellaril under a statute requiring him to have the mental capacity to aid in his defense and understand the nature of the charges against him. 193 This finding of competence created a presumption that Riggins could have a fair trial, which Riggins failed to overcome by showing specific ways in which he could not participate in his defense. 9 4 Moreover, argued Justice Thomas, Dr. Quass, and Dr. O'Gorman both believed Mellaril helped Riggins by increasing his cognitive capacity.' 95 The dissent concluded that the record "does not even support [Riggins' ] assertion that Mellaril made him worse off" at trial. Initially, Justice Thomas expressed doubt that Riggins was medicated against his will. Riggins took Mellaril voluntarily after his arrest and, although the court refused to enjoin further treatment in response to Riggins' motion, "it did not order him to take any medication."' 9 8 Justice Thomas next stated that Riggins cannot com-plain about a violation of his liberty because he argued below for reversal of his conviction only on the ground that he was denied a fair trial. 19 9 Finally, Justice Thomas would not have considered the Harper issue because the Court granted certiorari to decide whether Riggins was denied a fair trial, and not to determine whether Riggins had a liberty interest in being free from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. 20 0 Justice Thomas noted that the Court does not ordinarily consider issues that were not raised below or were not included in the petition for certiorari. Justice Scalia joined in Justice Thomas' further conclusion that even if the Harper issue is considered, it did not warrant the reversal of Riggins' conviction. The dissent agreed that a pretrial detainee has at least the same liberty as the inmate in Harper. 20 2 However, the dissent pointed out that Harper sought only civil damages and injunctive relief against future medication. 205 "Even if Nevada failed to make the findings necessary to support forced administration of Mellaril, this failure, without more, would not constitute a trial error or a flaw in the trial mechanism." 20 4 Thus, the dissent argued, even if Riggins' liberty was unjustly violated, he was limited to civil remedies unless he showed that his trial was actually prejudiced. 20 5 Justice Thomas demonstrated the need for actual prejudice through an analogy: "[T]he Court surely would not reverse a criminal conviction for a Harper violation involving medications such as penicillin," yet "we have no indication in this case... that Mellaril unfairly prejudiced Riggins." 206 Since the dissent believed Riggins received a fair trial, it was not necessary for Justice Thomas to define the precise standards to be used in judging when medication may be compelled. However, the Court's discussion of these standards troubled Justice Thomas. The dissent chastised the majority for purporting to rely on Harper while applying standards that differed substantially from Harper's. 20 7 Justice Thomas conceded that "the standards for forcibly medicating inmates may well differ from those for persons awaiting trial."
He stressed, though, that the Harper Court struck down the lower court's holding that a compelling state interest was required to justify involuntary medication. 20 9 Instead, the Supreme Court in Harper held that the standard of reasonableness should apply and that the existence of less intrusive means of accommodating the state's interest does not invalidate the state's policy. 210 Since the Riggins' majority faulted the trial court for failing to find that "compelling concerns" outweighed Riggins' liberty interest and for not contemplating "less intrusive alternatives," 21 ' the dissent concluded that the majority adopted "a standard of strict scrutiny." 21 2 V. ANALYSIS According to this Note, the Riggins Court correctly recognized that a pretrial detainee has a liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. While the Court's restraint prevented it from dictating the degree of protection that this liberty interest deserves, this Note argues that the Court's opinion should be interpreted as requiring strict scrutiny of any decision to administer antipsychotic drugs against a detainee's will. This Note also argues that the Court erroneously equated the risk of harmful side effects with the risk of trial prejudice. While the potential adverse effects of antipsychotic drugs certainly must be considered when prospectively deciding to medicate a pretrial detainee, the risk alone of side effects that never manifest themselves at trial has no effect on the fairness of a verdict. A careful assessment of the effects of these drugs should have led the Court to require a showing that the drugs actually prejudiced a defendant's trial before reversing a criminal conviction. Although the Court explicitly declined to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny, Justice Thomas correctly perceived that the effect of the majority's analysis was to do just that. 21 6 There are many indications that if the Supreme Court had decided the issue in Riggins, it would have required strict scrutiny in cases involving pretrial detainees. As Justice Thomas argued, the majority used the terms of strict scrutiny which were rejected in To the extent that the Court's opinion can be interpreted as requiring strict scrutiny, the Court properly judged the intrusiveness of unwanted antipsychotic drugs on a person's liberty. The Court correctly based its assessment of Riggins' liberty interest on the risks posed by antipsychotics at the time the decision to medicate was made, rather than on the effects that Riggins actually suffered after medication began. Justice O'Connor quoted Harper's conclusion that the risks of acute dystonia, akathisia, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, and tardive dyskinesia represent a "substantial interference with a person's liberty." 22 7 The Court failed to note that Mellaril is the antipsychotic agent least likely to cause these neurological side effects. 2 28 As the Harper opinion pointed out, however, even if an operation is very likely to be successful, a state cannot compel a person to undergo surgery against her will.229 The forcible administration of even a harmless drug like aspirin intrudes upon a person's liberty and bodily autonomy, 23 0 but her interest in protecting that liberty increases in proportion to the adverse effects that intrusion could have on her well-being. A person should not have to suffer serious side effects or death from a medication before being able to assert her interest in avoiding those risks. In Riggins, the Court properly concluded that the risks alone of antipsychotic drugs to a patient's health were great enough to warrant substantial due process protection, arguably even strict scrutiny.
A. THE RISKS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS JUSTIFY STRICT SCRUTINY

B. ACTUAL PREJUDICE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO IMPLICATE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The Riggins Court correctly recognized that antipsychotic drugs can interfere with a defendant's right to a fair trial. The Court focused not on the threshold issue of competency to stand trial, but on the effects of Mellaril on Riggins' demeanor and appearance at trial and on his ability to assist in his defense. 23 1 The majority worried that the high dosage Riggins was taking would make him "uptight" and that the sedation effect of Mellaril could be "severe enough to affect thought processes." 23 2 The majority concluded that these effects could have impacted Riggins' appearance, as well as the content of his testimony and his ability to assist his lawyer in his defense. 2 33 Justice Kennedy agreed that the symptoms of akathisia, parkinsonism, and sedation may prejudice a defendant's trial by altering his demeanor and rendering him unable or unwilling to assist his attorney in his defense.
34
While these side effects certainly have the potential to prejudice a trial, the risk that the drugs will cause an unfair trial is not a harm in and of itself. Unlike the act of forcing a person to consume drugs, which is inherently a violation of that person's liberty even if no adverse effects occur, 23 5 trial prejudice may be proven and remedied if, and when, it occurs. There is a risk that any trial will be prejudiced by any number of factors. For example, a defendant forced to take antihistamines may feel drowsy, but the risk of trial prejudice from that intrusion on the defendant's liberty is negligible. 23 6 If unwanted antipsychotic drugs could help, or at least not impair, a person's defense, his interest in a fair trial would not be infringed.
Nevertheless, the majority held that a showing of a strong possibility of prejudice is sufficient to justify the reversal of a criminal conviction. 2 The majority also ignored the fact that there are many ways of ensuring the fairness of a trial, even if the defendant suffers from some of the side effects of antipsychotic drugs.
First, the Court failed to emphasize that harmful side effects are relatively rare and, even when they do occur, can often be cured or treated to reduce the adverse effects. 24 3 In addition, patients often develop tolerances to the sedative effect of the drugs. 244 Second, since most side effects can be objectively diagnosed, a defendant will be able either to demonstrate the effects or have them diagnosed by an expert. Once such a side effect manifests itself, its potential effect on the fairness of the trial can be considered by the court. 2 The majority did not deny that such testimony may allow jurors to properly assess the drug's impact on a defendant's outward appearance and behavior. The only reason the majority gave for rejecting the notion that testimony can correct for the effects of antipsychotic drugs at trial was that such testimony cannot offset the effects on the defendant's cognitive processes. 248 The majority is certainly correct that testimony alone cannot account for all the effects of antipsychotic drugs.
The majority's conclusion, however, ignored the fact that a defendant on antipsychotic drugs must still be found competent to stand trial. 24 9 The test to determine competency specifically determines if the defendant has the cognitive capability to consult with her lawyer and follow the proceedings against her-the very abilities the Court believed could be affected by antipsychotic drugs. 250 The majority never mentioned that Riggins was receiving the maximum dose of 800 milligrams of Mellaril during his trial, despite the fact that he had been found competent to stand trial while taking only 450 milligrams per day. 2 5 1 IfJustice O'Connor's speculation is correct that large doses caused drowsiness to the extent of inhibiting cognitive functions, 25 2 Riggins' interests could have been protected by requesting a competency determination at the time of trial. If Riggins had been found competent while taking 800 milligrams, he should have been presumed to have sufficient cognitive capacity to consult with counsel and testify in his own behalf. Expert testimony, as well as the testimony of Riggins himself, could have informed the jury of any changes in Riggins' demeanor as a result of the drug, and the potential for bias would have been eliminated.
As the dissent argued, the Court should have required a showing of actual prejudice before reversing Riggins' conviction. If a state makes a strong enough case for medication to survive strict scrutiny, it should not later have the nearly impossible burden of disproving the existence of all the possible side effects of antipsychotic drugs. If the state has the burden of proof, a defendant could allege that she suffered from side effects that really never occurred, or at least which she could not prove if she had the burden of proof. Instead, a state should only have to demonstrate that the defendant had a fair trial. A standard that requires defendants to prove they were actually prejudiced by the effects of an unwanted drug encourages defendants to specify the side effects from which they suffer. Treatment can then be obtained, or testimony offered, to mitigate the effects of the drugs on a defendant's trial. Once a state shows an interest compelling enough to justify forcible medication, the state should be entitled to the benefits of antipsychotic drugs unless the defendant is incompetent or so afflicted by side effects that her trial cannot be made fair.
VI. CONCLUSION
It remains to be determined what degree of protection courts will afford to the liberty interest of a pretrial detainee in being free from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. If courts apply a standard of strict scrutiny, as this Note argues they should, the question after dering an accused competent to stand trial is sufficient tojustify the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs. 257 The prime value of antipsychotic drugs to states in criminal proceedings is their ability to render an otherwise incompetent defendant competent to stand trial. However, if a defendant's competence depends on continued antipsychotic medication, the state's interest in bringing the accused to trial comes into direct conflict with the accused's liberty interest. After Riggins, the Court would probably hold that a detainee's liberty interest outweighs the state's desire to medicate. The State's true interest is not just in a trial, but in a fair trial. 258 Given the majority's fear of the risks of antipsychotic drugs and Justice Kennedy's desire to hold that the the drugs are inherently prejudicial at trial, it seems likely that the Court would not allow an accused to be rendered "artificially competent" 259 to stand trial unless an outstanding, and maybe impossible, showing of need and the lack of prejudice were made by the State. Since there are many non-prejudicial ways to account for the effects of antipsychotic drugs at trial, this Note concludes that such a holding would unjustifiably prevent states from realizing the remarkable benefits of antipsychotic drugs. WILLIAM 
